Sunday, April 26, 2020

BeEF: Browser Exploitation Framework


"BeEF is the browser exploitation framework. A professional tool to demonstrate the real-time impact of XSS browser vulnerabilities. Development has focused on creating a modular structure making new module development a trivial process with the intelligence residing within BeEF. Current modules include the first public Inter-protocol Exploit, a traditional browser overflow exploit, port scanning, keylogging, clipboard theft and more." read more...


Website: http://www.bindshell.net/tools/beef


More info


  1. Blog Hacking
  2. Hacker Definicion
  3. Machine Learning Hacking
  4. Libros De Hacking Pdf

Saturday, April 25, 2020

Ettercap: Man In The Middle (MITM)


"Ettercap is a suite for man in the middle attacks on LAN. It features sniffing of live connections, content filtering on the fly and many other interesting tricks. It supports active and passive dissection of many protocols (even ciphered ones) and includes many feature for network and host analysis." read more...


Website: http://ettercap.sourceforge.net

Related links

DeepEnd Research: Analysis Of Trump's Secret Server Story


 We posted our take on the Trump's server story. If you have any feedback or corrections, send me an email (see my blog profile on Contagio or DeepEnd Research)

Analysis of Trump's secret server story...



Related links

  1. Hacking School
  2. Wifi Hacking App
  3. Hacking Growth Pdf
  4. Life Hacking
  5. Hacking Etico Curso Gratis
  6. Programas De Hacker

Friday, April 24, 2020

Why (I Believe) WADA Was Not Hacked By The Russians

Disclaimer: This is my personal opinion. I am not an expert in attribution. But as it turns out, not many people in the world are good at attribution. I know this post lacks real evidence and is mostly based on speculation.



Let's start with the main facts we know about the WADA hack, in chronological order:


1. Some point in time (August - September 2016), the WADA database has been hacked and exfiltrated
2. August 15th, "WADA has alerted their stakeholders that email phishing scams are being reported in connection with WADA and therefore asks its recipients to be careful"  https://m.paralympic.org/news/wada-warns-stakeholders-phishing-scams
3. September 1st, the fancybear.net domain has been registered
   Domain Name: FANCYBEAR.NET
...
Updated Date: 18-sep-2016
Creation Date: 01-sep-2016
4. The content of the WADA hack has been published on the website
5. The @FancyBears and @FancyBearsHT Twitter accounts have been created and started to tweet on 12th September, reaching out to journalists
6. 12th September, Western media started headlines "Russia hacked WADA"
7. The leaked documents have been altered, states WADA https://www.wada-ama.org/en/media/news/2016-10/cyber-security-update-wadas-incident-response


The Threatconnect analysis

The only technical analysis on why Russia was behind the hack, can be read here: https://www.threatconnect.com/blog/fancy-bear-anti-doping-agency-phishing/

After reading this, I was able to collect the following main points:

  1. It is Russia because Russian APT groups are capable of phishing
  2. It is Russia because the phishing site "wada-awa[.]org was registered and uses a name server from ITitch[.]com, a domain registrar that FANCY BEAR actors recently used"
  3. It is Russia because "Wada-arna[.]org and tas-cass[.]org were registered through and use name servers from Domains4bitcoins[.]com, a registrar that has also been associated with FANCY BEAR activity."
  4. It is Russia, because "The registration of these domains on August 3rd and 8th, 2016 are consistent with the timeline in which the WADA recommended banning all Russian athletes from the Olympic and Paralympic games."
  5. It is Russia, because "The use of 1&1 mail.com webmail addresses to register domains matches a TTP we previously identified for FANCY BEAR actors."

There is an interesting side-track in the article, the case of the @anpoland account. Let me deal with this at the end of this post.

My problem with the above points is that all five flag was publicly accessible to anyone as TTP's for Fancy Bear. And meanwhile, all five is weak evidence. Any script kittie in the world is capable of both hacking WADA and planting these false-flags.

A stronger than these weak pieces of evidence would be:

  • Malware sharing same code attributed to Fancy Bear (where the code is not publicly available or circulating on hackforums)
  • Private servers sharing the IP address with previous attacks attributed to Fancy Bear (where the server is not a hacked server or a proxy used by multiple parties)
  • E-mail addresses used to register the domain attributed to Fancy Bear
  • Many other things
For me, it is quite strange that after such great analysis on Guccifer 2.0, the Threatconnect guys came up with this low-value post. 


The fancybear website

It is quite unfortunate that the analysis was not updated after the documents have been leaked. But let's just have a look at the fancybear . net website, shall we?

Now the question is, if you are a Russian state-sponsored hacker group, and you are already accused of the hack itself, do you create a website with tons of bears on the website, and do you choose the same name (Fancy Bear) for your "Hack team" that is already used by Crowdstrike to refer to a Russian state-sponsored hacker group? Well, for me, it makes no sense. Now I can hear people screaming: "The Russians changed tactics to confuse us". Again, it makes no sense to change tactics on this, while keeping tactics on the "evidence" found by Threatconnect.

It makes sense that a Russian state-sponsored group creates a fake persona, names it Guccifer 2.0, pretends Guccifer 2.0 is from Romania, but in the end it turns out Guccifer 2.0 isn't a native Romanian speaker. That really makes sense.

What happens when someone creates this fancybear website for leaking the docs, and from the Twitter account reaches out to the media? Journalists check the website, they see it was done by Fancy Bear, they Bing Google this name, and clearly see it is a Russian state-sponsored hacker group. Some journalists also found the Threatconnect report, which seems very convincing for the first read. I mean, it is a work of experts, right? So you can write in the headlines that the hack was done by the Russians.

Just imagine an expert in the USA or Canada writing in report for WADA:
"the hack was done by non-Russian, but state-sponsored actors, who planted a lot of false-flags to accuse the Russians and to destroy confidence in past and future leaks". Well, I am sure this is not a popular opinion, and whoever tries this, risks his career. Experts are human, subject to all kinds of bias.

The Guardian

The only other source I was able to find is from The Guardian, where not just one side (it was Russia) was represented in the article. It is quite unfortunate that both experts are from Russia - so people from USA will call them being not objective on the matter. But the fact that they are Russian experts does not mean they are not true ...

https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2016/sep/15/fancy-bears-hackers--russia-wada-tues-leaks

Sergei Nikitin:
"We don't have this in the case of the DNC and Wada hacks, so it's not clear on what basis conclusions are being drawn that Russian hackers or special services were involved. It's done on the basis of the website design, which is absurd," he said, referring to the depiction of symbolically Russian animals, brown and white bears, on the "Fancy Bears' Hack Team" website.

I don't agree with the DNC part, but this is not the topic of conversation here.

Alexander Baranov:
"the hackers were most likely amateurs who published a "semi-finished product" rather than truly compromising information. "They could have done this more harshly and suddenly," he said. "If it was [state-sponsored] hackers, they would have dug deeper. Since it's enthusiasts, amateurs, they got what they got and went public with it.""

The @anpoland side-track

First please check the tas-cas.org hack https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=day5Aq0bHsA  , I will be here when you finished it. This is a website for "Court of Arbitration for Sport's", and referring to the Threatconnect post, "CAS is the highest international tribunal that was established to settle disputes related to sport through arbitration. Starting in 2016, an anti-doping division of CAS began judging doping cases at the Olympic Games, replacing the IOC disciplinary commission." Now you can see why this attack is also discussed here.


  • My bet is that this machine was set-up for these @anpoland videos only. Whether google.ru is a false flag or it is real, hard to decide. It is interesting to see that there is no google search done via google.ru, it is used only once. 
  • The creator of the video can't double click. Is it because he has a malfunctioning mouse? Is it because he uses a virtualization console, which is near-perfect OPSEC to hide your real identity? My personal experience is that using virtualization consoles remotely (e.g. RDP) has very similar effects to what we can see on the video. 
  • The timeline of the Twitter account is quite strange, registered in 2010
  • I agree with the Threatconnect analysis that this @anpoland account is probably a faketivist, and not an activist. But who is behind it, remains a mystery. 
  • Either the "activist" is using a whonix-like setup for remaining anonymous, or a TOR router (something like this), or does not care about privacy at all. Looking at the response times (SQLmap, web browser), I doubt this "activist" is behind anything related to TOR. Which makes no sense for an activist, who publishes his hack on Youtube. People are stupid for sure, but this does not add up. It makes sense that this was a server (paid by bitcoins or stolen credit cards or whatever) rather than a home computer.
For me, this whole @anpoland thing makes no sense, and I think it is just loosely connected to the WADA hack. 

The mysterious Korean characters in the HTML source

There is another interesting flag in the whole story, which actually makes no sense. When the website was published, there were Korean characters in HTML comments. 



When someone pointed this out on Twitter, these Korean HTML comments disappeared:
These HTML comments look like generated HTML comments, from a WYSIWYG editor, which is using the Korean language. Let me know if you can identify the editor.

The Russians are denying it

Well, what choice they have? It does not matter if they did this or not, they will deny it. And they can't deny this differently. Just imagine a spokesperson: "Previously we have falsely denied the DCC and DNC hacks, but this time please believe us, this wasn't Russia." Sounds plausible ...

Attribution

Let me sum up what we know:

It makes sense that the WADA hack was done by Russia, because:

  1. Russia being almost banned from the Olympics due to doping scandal, it made sense to discredit WADA and US Olympians
  2. There are multiple(weak) pieces of evidence which point to Russia
It makes sense that the WADA hack was not done by  Russia, because: 
  1. By instantly attributing the hack to the Russians, the story was more about to discredit Russia than discrediting WADA or US Olympians.
  2. In reality, there was no gain for Russia for disclosing the documents. Nothing happened, nothing changed, no discredit for WADA. Not a single case turned out to be illegal or unethical.
  3. Altering the leaked documents makes no sense if it was Russia (see update at the end). Altering the leaked documents makes a lot of sense if it was not Russia. Because from now on, people can always state "these leaks cannot be trusted, so it is not true what is written there". It is quite cozy for any US organization, who has been hacked or will be hacked. If you are interested in the "Russians forging leaked documents" debate, I highly recommend to start with this The Intercept article
  4. If the Korean characters were false flags planted by the Russians, why would they remove it? If it had been Russian characters, I would understand removing it.
  5. All evidence against Russia is weak, can be easily forged by even any script kittie.

I don't like guessing, but here is my guess. This WADA hack was an operation of a (non-professional) hackers-for-hire service, paid by an enemy of Russia. The goal was to hack WADA, leak the documents, modify some contents in the documents, and blame it all on the Russians ...

Questions and answers

  • Was Russia capable of doing this WADA hack? Yes.
  • Was Russia hacking WADA? Maybe yes, maybe not.
  • Was this leak done by a Russian state-sponsored hacker group? I highly doubt that.
  • Is it possible to buy an attribution-dice where all six-side is Russia? No, it is sold-out. 

To quote Patrick Gray: "Russia is the new China, and the Russians ate my homework."©

Let me know what you think about this, and please comment. 

Read more

Thursday, April 23, 2020

SANS SEC575 Mentor Class

Hi everyone,

Great news! I will be mentoring SANS 575: Mobile Device Security and Ethical Hacking in Luxembourg on Thursday evenings 18:00-20:00, starting from January 15, 2015.

Mentor classes are special, 10 week-format SANS classroom sessions that give the students time to absorb and master the same material with the guidance of a trained security professional.

Students receive all the same course materials used at SANS conferences and study at a more leisurely pace, so students will have:
  • Hardcopy set of SANS course books
  • Mentor Program study materials
  • Weekly Mentor led sessions
Prior to the weekly Mentor-led classroom sessions, students study SANS course material at their own pace. Each week, students meet with other professionals in their hometown area and the SANS mentor, who leads topical discussions pointing out the most salient features of the weekly material studied, provides hands-on demonstrations, and answer questions. The Mentor's goal is to help student's grasp the more difficult material, master the exercises, demonstrate the tools and prepare for GIAC certification.

On SANS SEC575, we will learn about mobile device infrastructures, policies and management, we will see the security models of the different platforms, like the data storage and file system architecture. We will also see how to unlock, root and jailbreak mobile devices in order to prepare them for data extraction and further testing. In the second half of the course, we will learn how to perform static and dynamic mobile application analysis, the usage of automated application analysis tools and how to manipulate application behavior. Last but not least, we will see how to perform mobile penetration testing that includes fingerprinting mobile devices, wireless network probing and scanning, attacking wireless infrastructures, using network manipulation attacks and attacks against mobile applications and back-end applications.

For more info, here is the link for the class: http://www.sans.org/mentor/class/sec575-luxembourg-15jan2015-david-szili
My Mentor bio: http://www.sans.org/mentor/bios#david-szili 

Information on the class, special discounts and applying for the class: szili_(dot)_david_(at)_hotmail_(dot)_com

Additional info can be also found at: https://www.sans.org/mentor
Some special price is also available for this course. A few examples: http://www.sans.org/mentor/specials

Best regards,
David

Such low price. Very SANS. Much learning. Wow!

Related posts


Wednesday, April 22, 2020

July 2019 Connector

OWASP
Connector
  July 2019

COMMUNICATIONS


Letter from the Vice-Chairman:
Since the last Connector, the Foundation has seen an extremely positive response to hosting a Global AppSec conference in Tel Aviv. The event was well attended with great speakers and training, furthering our mission to improving software security on a global level.

Next up we have a Global AppSec conference in both Amsterdam and Washington DC. We have migrated away from the regional naming convention so in previous years these events would have been Europe and US. Planning for both events is well underway with some excellent keynotes being lined up. We hope you can join us at these conferences.

As part of our community outreach, the Board and volunteers will be at BlackHat and DEFCON in Las Vegas next month. The Board will have a two-day workshop two days before the conference, but during the conference will look to talk to and collaborate with as many of the community as possible. We are really looking forward to this.

It is that time of the year again, the global Board of Directors nominations are now open. There are four seats up for re-election: mine (Owen), Ofer, Sherif, and Chenxi. I would ask those who would like to help drive the strategic direction of the Foundation to step forward. If you are not interested in running, why not submit questions to those who are running.

Recently the Executive Director has put forward a new initiative to change the way in which we utilize our funds in achieving our mission. The aim here is to have one pot of money where there will be fewer restrictions to chapter expenses. Funds will be provided to all, albeit as long as they are reasonable. The Board sees this as a positive step in our community outreach.

Finally, I would like to ask those who are interested in supporting the Foundation, reach out to each Board member about assisting in  one of the following strategic goals, as set out by the board at the start of the year:
  • Marketing the OWASP brand 
  • Membership benefits
  • Developer outreach
    • Improve benefits 
    • Decrease the possibility of OWASP losing relevance
    • Reaching out to management and Risk levels
    • Increase involvement in new tech/ ways of doing things – dev-ops
  • Project focus 
    • Get Universities involved
    • Practicum sponsored ideas
    • Internships 
  • Improve finances
  • Improve OWASP/ Board of Directors Perception
  • Process improvement
  • Get consistent Executive Director support
  • Community empowerment
Thanks and best wishes,
Owen Pendlebury, Vice Chair
 
UPDATE FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR:

Change: If we change nothing, how could we expect to be in a different place a year from now? It has been truly a pleasure these first six months as your Interim Executive Director and I look forward to many years to come. Everyone has done a great job helping me see our opportunities and challenges. And the challenges are real - both internally and our position in the infosec community. I'm biased toward action.

My first task has been to redesign and optimize our operations. This will help staff to be more responsive while also saving the funds donated to the Foundation for our work on projects and chapters. This will also mean changes for you too. Communities work better when everyone always assumes we are all operating with the best of intentions. I can assure you that is the case of our Board, leaders, and staff. Evaluate our changes through this view and we'll save time and our collective sanity.

One big project that is coming to life is our new website. We will soon be entering our 20th year and we needed to not just refresh the look but completely retool it for the next 20 years. We are rebuilding it from the ground up and we can't wait to share our progress. Over the next month or so we will be sharing more information on that project. Stay tuned!

Mike McCamon, Interim Executive Director
OWASP FOUNDATION UPDATE FROM EVENTS DIRECTOR:

OWASP is pleased to announce our newest staff member, Sibah Poede will be joining us as the Events Coordinator and will begin full-time on 1 July.

Sibah is a graduate of London South Bank University where she received a BA (Hons) Marketing Management. Prior to that, she gained a diploma in Market & Economics at the Copenhagen Business School, Neil's Brock, Denmark. After graduation, she launched her career in London working with Hilton International hotels at the Conference and Events department. She eventually moved on to work with Kaplan International Colleges in the marketing department. Later, she joined Polyglobe Group, and then Uniglobe within the travel sector, where she was involved in global exhibitions and events, account management and sales.

She has lived in Denmark, Nigeria, Switzerland, and currently lives in London. In her spare time, she enjoys traveling and learning new cultures. She is also part of the Soup Kitchen Muswell Hill, a charity organization involved in feeding the homeless.
Please join us in welcoming Sibah to the team.

Emily Berman
Events Director
As many of you are aware, the OWASP Foundation has a Meetup Pro account.  We are requesting that all Chapters, Projects, Committees, and any other OWASP Meetup pages be transferred to the OWASP Foundation account.
OWASP Foundation will be the Organizer of the Group and all Leaders/Administrators will be Co-Organizers with the same edit rights.  
Once the Meetup page is transferred to our account, the Foundation will be funding the cost of the Meetup page.  If you do not want to continue being charged for your Meetup subscription account, you should then cancel it. Thereafter no Chapter, Project, etc. will be billed for Meetup.  Going forward the Foundation will no longer approve any reimbursement requests for Meetup.

  For instructions on how to move your Meetup group to the OWASP Foundation account please see https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Meetup_Information


OWASP Members visit our website for $200 savings on Briefing passes for BlackHat USA 2019.

EVENTS 

You may also be interested in one of our other affiliated events:

REGIONAL AND LOCAL EVENTS
Event DateLocation
OWASP Auckland Training Day 2019 August 10, 2019 Auckland, New Zealand
OWASP security.ac.nc-Wellington Day 2019 August 24, 2019 Wellington , New Zealand
OWASP Portland Training Day September 25, 2019 Portland, OR
OWASP Italy Day Udine 2019 September 27, 2019 Udine, Italy
OWASP Portland Day October 16,2019 Wroclaw, Poland
BASC 2019 (Boston Application Security Conference) October 19,2019 Burlington, MA
LASCON X October 24-25,2019 Austin, TX
OWASP AppSec Day 2019 Oct 30 - Nov 1, 2019 Melbourne, Australia
German OWASP Day 2019 December 9-10, 2019 Karlsruhe, Germany

PARTNER AND PROMOTIONAL EVENTS
Event Date Location
BlackHat USA 2019 August 3-8,2019 Las Vegas, Nevada
DefCon 27 August 8-11,2019 Las Vegas, Nevada
it-sa-IT Security Expo and Congress October 8-10, 2019 Germany

PROJECTS

Project Reviews from Global AppSec Tel Aviv 2019 are still being worked on.  Thank you to the reviewers that helped with it.  If you have time to help finalize the reviews, please contact me (harold.blankenship@owasp.com) and let me know.

We continue to push forward with Google Summer of Code.  First and student evaluations are past and we are in our third work period.  Final evaluations are due 19th August!
The Project Showcase at Global AppSec DC 2019 is shaping up to be a fantastic track.  Please note the following schedule.
 
  Schedule
Time Thursday, September 12
10:30 Secure Medical Device Deployment Standard Christopher Frenz
11:30 Secure Coding Dojo Paul Ionescu
1:00 p.m. Lunch Break
15:30 API Security Project Erez Yalon
16:30 Defect Dojo Matt Tesauro
Time Friday, September 13
10:30 Dependency Check Jeremy Long
11:30 SAMM John Ellingsworth, Hardik Parekh
1:00 p.m. Lunch Break
15:30 SEDATED Dennis Kennedy
16:30 <open>  

New Release of ESAPI # 2.2.0.0: 


On June 25, a new ESAPI release, the first in over 3 years, was uploaded to Maven Central. The release # is 2.2.0.0. The release includes over 100 closed GitHub Issues and over 2600 additional unit tests. For more details, see the release notes at:
https://github.com/ESAPI/esapi-java-legacy/blob/esapi-2.2.0.0/documentation/esapi4java-core-2.2.0.0-release-notes.txt

A special shout out to project co-leader Matt Seil, and major contributors Jeremiah Stacey and Dave Wichers for their ongoing invaluable assistance in this effort.
-- Kevin Wall, ESAPI project co-lead
OWASP ESAPI wiki page and the GitHub project page.

COMMUNITY

 
Welcome New OWASP Chapters
Indore, India
Panama City, Panama
Medellin, Colombia
Cartagena, Colombia
Aarhus, Denmark
Dhaka, Bangladesh
Edmonton, Canada
Lincoln, Nebraska
Sanaa, Yemen
Noida, India
Mumbai, India

MEMBERSHIP

 
We would like to welcome the following Premier and Contributor Corporate Members.

 Contributor Corporate Members

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